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Abstract
Public-key infrastructures are a prerequisite for security
in distributed systems and for reliable electronic commerce.
It is their goal to provide the authenticity of public keys.
Formal models for public-key infrastructures (trust models)
contribute decisively to a deeper understanding of the de-
sirable design principles of these infrastructures. The trust
model of the present paper is based on the modelling tech-
nique of coloured Petri nets. These are a special class of
high-level Petri nets with an intuitively appealing graphical
representation and a few, but powerful primitives. Elabo-
rate and well tested software is available.
1. Introduction
Public-key cryptography is a prerequisite for electronic
commerce and electronic government. Although public
keys do not need to be kept secret, and in fact wide knowl-
edge of an entity’s public key is desirable, the security prob-
lem is that Alice must know for certain that a particular pub-
lic key really does belong to Bob. If Alice can be tricked
into thinking thatMallory’s public key is Bob’s, Mallory can
impersonate Bob to Alice. The protection of public keys
against attacks is the vulnerable spot of public-key cryptog-
raphy. Please note that here, and in the following entities are
often called Alice and Bob (following tradition in cryptog-
raphy). However, the reader should keep in mind that they
could be a human, a server, a client machine or a personal
token like a chipcard or something else.
It is the goal of a public-key infrastructure (PKI) to solve
the above mentioned problem. Public-key infrastructures
rest on the concept of a public-key certificate. A certificate
binds the entity’s identity to the specified public key. If Al-
ice has several certificates, she can build a chain of certifi-
cates where each public key is certified by the previous en-
tity in the chain, and where she has specified the first pub-
lic key as authentic and all intermediate entities as trust-
worthy. Section 2 shows how trust can be propagated in a
similar way by the concept of a recommendation. Usually,
these pieces of information are stored at different places.
So, a public key infrastructure can be seen as a distributed
database of public-key certificates, recommendations and
further information. Thus, it forms a web of certificates and
recommendations. Trust plays a prominent role in this web.
Consequently, models for public-key infrastructures are of-
ten called trust models.
Usually, a user of a public-key infrastructure has a set
of statements about the authenticity of certain public keys
and on the trustworthiness of certain entities. Together with
the available collection of certificates and recommendations
this makes up the user’s (Alice’s) view to the public-key in-
frastructure. It is not the aim of this paper to discuss the
problem, how Alice can find the necessary set of informa-
tion that enables her to prove the authenticity of a certain
public key. Rather, this paper gives a formal method that
finds all the statements about the authenticity of public keys
that can be derived from Alice’s view. For this purpose it
uses themodelling technique of coloured Petri nets (see [3]).
The model in [7] achieves the same goal by a logical calcu-
lus, fromwhich the presentmodel is derived to a high extent.
However, the modelling technique of coloured Petri nets is
more easily accessible for unexperienced users. Addition-
ally, the present model can be embedded into Petri nets for
cryptographic protocols in a straightforward manner. The
model focuses on the main aspects of public-key infrastruc-
tures and does not yet include certificate revocation.
2. Alice’s view
Certificates propagate authenticity of public keys. How-
ever, this goal is achieved only if the user of the certificate
trusts its issuer. Since the former cannot know personally
all the entities he/she has to rely on, there is also a need for
propagation of trust. This task is done by recommendations.
A recommendation can be considered as a signed statement
about the trustworthiness of another entity.
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Let it be Alice’s aim to establish the authenticity of an-
other person’s, for instance Bob’s, public key. For that pur-
pose she builds her initial view, which includes all the cer-
tificates and recommendations that can be relevant for au-
thenticating Bob’s public key and can be retrieved from
the public-key infrastructure. Additionally, Alice’s view in-
cludes statements as a part of her belief, such as authenticity
of certain public keys and trust in certain entities. Following
[5] and [7] trust is modelled with respect to entities and not
with respect to keys. Formally speaking, Alice’s view is a
set of statements of the type given in the following defini-
tion (cf. [7]).
Definition 1 (Statements and Alice’s view) Alice’s view
is a set of statements of the following type: Aut(X,P) says
that Alice is convinced that the public key   belongs to
entity  (authenticity). Cert(X,P,Y,Q) says that Alice holds
a certificate, which asserts that  is a public key for entity
 . This certificate is allegedly issued and signed by entity
 . The signature passes verification by the public key
  . Trust(X,1) says that Alice is convinced that entity 
is trustworthy of level  , i.e. this entity can be trusted for
issuing certificates. Rec(X,P,Y,i) says that Alice holds a
recommendation of level  for entity  , i.e. it asserts that
entity  is trustworthy of level . This recommendation
is allegedly issued and signed by entity  . The signature
passes verification by the public key   . Trust(X,i) with
    says that Alice is convinced that entity  is trust-
worthy of level , i.e this entity can be trusted for issuing
recommendations of level     .
A remark about the word “alleged” in the definitions for
certificates and recommendations seems in place: Without
verification, it is not clear that entity has issued the certifi-
cate or the recommendation, respectively. However, if Alice
can gain evidence that the public key   belongs to entity ,
she can verify that entity is indeed the issuer. Alice’s view
allows a graphic representation. Figure 1 gives the graphic
elements for the statements of Definition 1.
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Figure 1. Graphic elements illustrating Alice’s
view (“A" refers to Alice)
Example 1 The public-key infrastructure of this example
is a global hierarchy model as suggested in the concept
Figure 2. Alice’s view (Example 1)
of Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM), which has been pre-
sented in [4]. The hierarchy consists of the single trust
anchor 
 (the Internet Policy Registration Authority).
The 
 directly issues certificates to a second tier of enti-
ties designated policy certification authorities (  	  	   ),
which, in turn, issue certificates to certification authorities
( 	 	   ). These certification authorities issue certifi-
cates to (subordinate) certification authorities or directly to
users (individuals, organizations). Let the user  with his
public key   be registered at certification authority  ,
which is registered at   . Alice wants to prove the authen-
ticity of user ’s public key  . Within the frame of PEM
it is reasonable to assume that she is able to collect those
statements in her view that are given in Figure 1. There is
a chain of certificates from 
 to  . In this chain,    
and    denote public keys for    and  , respectively.
The accompanying recommendationsmay be established by
off line means. For instance, in the case of a “high assur-
ance” policy certification authority    the recommendation
  	    	  	  might mean, that    executes a legal
contractwith the certification authority , which forces 
to use a high level of authentication when it grants certifi-
cates to its users; e.g.   might be obliged to strictly use as
a policy the same level of authentication it would employ in
issuing ID cards. This piece of information, digitally signed
by  ’s private key (the companion of the public key   ),
is the recommendation  	    	  	  .
Example 2 The ICE-TEL project has grown out of the Pri-
vacy EnhancedMail (PEM) concept and organises a public-
key infrastructure as a web of hierarchies (see [1]). Each
separate hierarchy is referred to as a security domain. Each
security domain has at its apex a single certification author-
ity, called the trusted point. This trusted point may certify
both users and subordinate certification authorities within
the domain confirming that they all abide by the same over-
all security policy. In the language of Definition 1 the latter
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can be interpreted as a recommendation for the subordinate
certification authority issued and signed by the trusted point.
The name and public key of the trusted point is known to
all the objects in the domain. This public key will initially
be distributed by some out of band proprietary means. This
public key of the trusted point and its associated policy id
are stored in the user’s personal security environment, which
can be modelled as the user’s (Alice’s) view. By construc-
tion this view contains both an Aut-statement and a Trust-
statement with respect to the trusted point (cf. Definition 1).
Let   be another user in the same security domain and let
Alice want to prove the authenticity of this user’s public key
 . Then the scenario is similar to Figure 2 with three lev-
els only and the trust point at the apex. So, the comments
made in Example 1 apply here, too.
However, ICE-TEL is more flexible than PEM. It allows
cross certification to remote security domains. The secu-
rity administrator of Alice’s local trusted point vets the re-
mote domain on behalf of the users in the local domain who
trust him to do so, and issues a cross certificate for the re-
mote trusted point, which does not only certify the public
key of this entity but also the policy in the remote domain.
The latter is accomplished by an appropriate entry in the pol-
icy mappings field in the X.509 Version 3 certificate. In the
language of Definition 1 this is a recommendation for the
remote trusted point issued by Alice’s trusted point. The
administrator of Alice’s trusted point can actually limit the
number of steps in the chain of certificates he is willing to
accept by a proper choice of the level in his recommenda-
tion. Indeed, in the X.509 Version 3 certificate the local ad-
ministrator can actually limit the number of users in the re-
mote domain that are to be trusted by specifying (via the
name constraints field) a subset of the user names from the
remote domain whose certificates are to be trusted. Let Al-
ice be a user in the security domain of the trusted point  
with public key  , whereas user   belongs to the se-
curity domain of the trusted point . If Alice wants to
prove the authenticity of user  ’s public key   without
authentic knowledge of the public key  of , she
will try to built a chain of certificates and accompanying rec-
ommendations first from     to  
and then from   to   . Alice has anAut-
statement for the public key of her trusted point  , and it
is assumed that her trust in   is sufficiently high. The
graph of the resulting view is given in Figure 3. It is struc-
turally equivalent to the graph in Figure 2.
With the exception of node “A” (for Alice) the nodes in
the graph of Figures 2 and 3 are pairs of entities and public
keys. Each pair represents a binding between an entity and
its alleged public key. Whether this binding is authentic un-
der Alice’s view or not can be decided by the formal method
given in the next section.
Figure 3. Alice’s view (Example 2)
3. The coloured Petri net model
Coloured Petri nets are special high-level Petri nets. A
thorough description is given in [3]. These nets have a
graphic representation which makes it easy even for non-
experts to grasp systems of high complexity. Coloured Petri
nets have a well-defined semantics which unambiguously
defines the behaviour of the net.
Petri nets have been invented to model processes. The
process Alice has to deal with is a result of Alice’s interest
in Aut-statements. Each of these statements proves the au-
thenticity of a binding between a public key and an entity.
The other statements, Trust, Cert and Rec, are of no direct
value for Alice. Their purpose is to support the derivation of
new Aut-statements. These derivations have to satisfy cer-
tain rules. These rules can be formalized and made precise
as transitions in a coloured Petri net. This net (see Figure
4) models the process of deriving all the Aut-statements that
are consistent with Alice’s view. It will be explained in de-
tail below.
Figure 4 has been drawn by the Design/CPN-software.
This is a graphic computer tool which supports the practical
use of coloured Petri nets. Resources and technical support
on Design/CPN are available via the web site [2]. All sim-
ulations in the present paper have been performed with this
software.
The coloured Petri net of Figure 4 uses seven colour
sets (types). They are defined in the global declaration
node. The net has four places: Alice, Certificates,
TrustPool and Recommendations. The place
Alice acts as a pool of Aut-statements. Consequently, its
colour set is Aut, which is defined as the cartesian product
of the colour sets Entity and Keystr. Thus, a token of
this type is a pair of strings. The first string identifies an
entity; the second string represents a key (cf. Definition 1).
The place Certificates collects the Cert-statements.
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Rule1
[i>=1]
Certificates
Cert 1‘("TA","PTA","P1","PP1") ++
1‘("P1","PP1","C1","PC1")++
1‘("C1","PC1","B","PB")
TrustPool
Trust
1‘("TA",3)
Alice
Aut
1‘("TA","PTA")
Rule2
[j>=1,k>=2]
Recommendations
Rec 1‘("TA","PTA","P1",2)++
1‘("P1","PP1","C1",1)
color Entity = string;
color Keystr = string;
color I = int;
color Aut = product Entity * Keystr;
color Cert = product Entity * Keystr * Entity * Keystr;
color Trust = product Entity * I;
color Rec = product Entity * Keystr * Entity * I;
var ent1, ent2, ent3, ent4 : Entity;
var key1, key2, key3 : Keystr;
var i, j, k : I;
fun min(n:I,m:I) = if n>m then m else n;
(ent1,i)
(ent1,i)(ent1,key1)
1‘(ent1,key1)++
1‘(ent2,key2)
(ent3,key3)
(ent3,key3)
(ent3,key3,ent4,j)
1‘(ent3,k)++
1‘(ent4,min(j,k-1))
(ent3,k)
(ent1,key1,ent2,key2)
Figure 4. The coloured Petri net trust model
These statements can be modelled as quadruples of strings
with identifiers for entities in the first and third components
and keystrings in the second and fourth components. The
colour set (Cert) of this place is defined accordingly in
the global declaration node. The places TrustPool and
Recommendations act as a pools of Trust-statements
and Rec-statements, respectively. The corresponding colour
sets, Trust and Rec, are again defined in the global decla-
ration node according to Definition 1. The initial marking in
Figure 4 corresponds to Alice’s view of Example 1. Please
note, that at each place the marking is a multi-set (see [3])
over the colour set attached to the place. For example, the
initial marking at the place Recommendations means
that this multi-set contains one appearance of the token
("TA","PTA","P1",2) and one appearance of the
token ("P1","PP1","C1",1). The transitions Rule1
and Rule2 are the core of the model.
Rule : This transition has three incoming and two out-
going arcs and a guard. The variables of this transition are:
ent1 and ent2 of colour Entity, key1 and key2 of
colour Keystr, i of colour I. Let now the data values
"TA", "PTA" , "P1", "PP1", and  be assigned to the
variables ent1, key1, ent2, key2, and i, respectively.
This creates a binding (which should not be confused with
the concept of a binding between an entity and a public key).
The pair consisting of a transition and a binding of its vari-
ables forms a binding element. In order for a binding ele-
ment to be enabled in a certainmarking of the places, it must
be possible to bind data values to the variables appearing
on the surrounding arc expressions and in the guard of this
transition such that each of the arc expressions evaluate to
tokens which are present in the corresponding input place.
Additionally, the guard must be satisfied.
For the above binding element these requirements are
fulfilled (in the case of the initial marking of Figure 4).
If a binding element is enabled, it is ready to occur. An
occurrence of the above binding element removes a to-
ken with the values("TA","PTA","P1","PP1") from
the place Certificates, it removes a token with the
values ("TA","PTA") from the place Alice and it re-
moves a token with the values ("TA",3) from the place
TrustPool. Further, it adds the tokens ("TA","PTA")
and ("P1","PP1") to the place Alice and the token
("TA",3) to the place TrustPool. Hence, the occur-
rence of the above binding element has the effect, that the
token ("TA","PTA","P1","PP1") (representing the
corresponding Cert-statement) is removed from the place
Certificates (the pool of certificates) and the token
("P1","PP1") (a new Aut-statement) is added to the
place Alice, which acts as the pool of Aut-statements. The
tokens ("PA","PTA") and ("TA",3) return to their
places. This is essential, because they may be needed
in further steps. It is not necessary to return the token
("TA","PTA","P1","PP1"). This token acts as a
certificate with the only purpose to establish the statement
Aut(P1,PP1) (represented by the token ("P1","PP1")).
Once this is done successfully, the certificate cannot be of
any further value.
The generalization of this example is straightforward and
shows that the transition Rule1 acts as a producer of state-
ments about the authenticity of public keys. It states that Al-
ice can derive the authenticity of the binding between the en-
tity   and the public key  (denoted by Aut(Y,Q) and rep-
resented in the model by the token ("Y","Q")), if the fol-
lowing three conditions are satisfied:
1. Alice holds a certificate, which says that  is a pub-
lic key for entity   . The alleged issuer and signer
of this certificate is entity  and the signature passes
verification by the public key  . This is denoted by
Cert(X,P,Y,Q) and represented in the model by the to-
ken ("X","P","Y","Q").
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2. Alice has or can derive the authenticity of the binding
between entity   and public key  . This is denoted
by Aut(X,P) and represented in the model by the token
("X","P").
3. Alice has or can derive trust of level with      for en-
tity  . This is denoted by Trust(X,i) and represented in
the model by the token ("X",i). It is tacitly assumed
that trust of level  implies trust of lower levels.
Rule: This transition has also three incoming and two
outgoing arcs and a guard. The variables of this transition
are: ent3 and ent4 of colour Entity, key3 of colour
Keystr, j and k of colour I.
The transition Rule2 acts as a producer of statements
about the trustworthiness of entities. It states that Alice can
derive trust in entity  of level  (denoted by Trust(Y,m)
and represented in the model by the token ("Y",m)), if the
following three conditions are satisfied:
1. Alice holds a recommendation, which says that  is
trustworthy of level  with    . The alleged is-
suer and signer of this recommendation is entity  and
the signature passes verification by the public key  .
This is denoted by Rec(X,P,Y,j) and represented in the
model by the token ("X","P","Y",j). It is tacitly
assumed that a recommendation of level  implies rec-
ommendations of lower levels.
2. Alice has or can derive the authenticity of the binding
between entity   and public key  . This is denoted
by Aut(X,P) and represented in the model by the token
("X","P").
3. Alice has or can derive trust of level  with      
for entity   . This is denoted by Trust(X,k) and rep-
resented in the model by the token ("X",k). It is
again tacitly assumed that trust of level  implies trust
of lower levels.
Please note, that the tokens that enter the transition Rule2
from the places Alice and TrustPool return to their
places. This is essential, because they may be needed
in further steps. However, it is not necessary to re-
turn the token that enters the transition from the place
Recommendations (see [6]).
4. Role of the occurrence graph
The prime interest in the application of the coloured Petri
net of Figure 4 is to find all the reachable markings of the
place Alice, because these markings correspond directly
to those Aut-statements that can be derived from Alice’s
view, if the marking corresponding to this view is chosen
as initial marking. This is closely related to the concept of
the occurrence graph. This graph contains a node for each
reachable marking and an arc for each occurring binding el-
ement (see [3]). Several dynamic properties of the Petri net
including its boundedness properties can be investigated us-
ing the occurrence graph.
Particularly useful is the best upper multi-set bound,
which is delivered in the standard report of the Design/CPN
occurrence graph tool. The best upper multi-set bound
for the place  is defined as the multi-set 
  
,
where 	 is the set of nodes (reachable markings) of the oc-
currence graph and  denotes the marking for place 
(see [3]). This definition is sound because all occurrence se-
quences of the coloured Petri net of Figure 4 are finite (see
[6]). The best upper multi-set bound for the place Alice
in this coloured Petri net contains exactly those tokens that
belong to reachable markings of this place.
Example 3 In Example 1 Design/CPN calculates the best
upper multi-set bound for the place Alice to
1‘("B","PB") ++ 1‘("C1","PC1") ++
1‘("P1","PP1") ++ 1‘("TA","PTA").
This notation for a multi-set follows the output of the De-
sign/CPN software and has been explained in Section 3.
Thus, the result proves the authenticity of the public key

for user 
.
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